In determining whether or not a crime was committed, ancient Greeks often used the “rule of halves.” At issue in this form of knowledge-power is whether prophesy “fits” with observation. For instance, Oedipus ultimately forfeited his sovereignty upon discovering the prophesy of his having killed his father to have been witnessed by a slave. A second (Greek and early-medieval) criterion for determining who committed a crime against whom, was to submit those involved in mutual disagreement to a “test.” Justice was done as the victor in the test was declared innocent. The “infraction” is a third (late-medieval) invention that allowed royalty to enrich themselves by confiscating fines from perpetrators whose crimes had offended the sovereign. Finally, self-policing (i.e., more recent surveillance of the masses over themselves) resulted as commoners’ urban migration afforded them strength in numbers at a time that they were striving to preempt arbitrary confiscations and punishments from an armed aristocracy. It is his understanding of knowledge that sets Foucault’s account of social change apart from that of Marx and Weber. Knowledge is neither a passive reflection of structural realities nor a static “meaning complex” that endows structure with meaning. Knowledge provides the terms according to which some are empowered and others are not. Yet it also develops historically as a means of improving the efficiency with which this empowerment is attained.